Why allow "everyone" to have read write permission?
(kb.synology.com)
from hardful9856@programming.dev to selfhosted@lemmy.world on 15 May 21:00
https://programming.dev/post/50467870
from hardful9856@programming.dev to selfhosted@lemmy.world on 15 May 21:00
https://programming.dev/post/50467870
kb.synology.com/…/Docker_container_cant_access_th…
Why allow “everyone” to have read write permission to shared folders in order to run container manager? Wouldn’t this be insecure?
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That seems to be what Synology is suggesting, and you’re right, this wouldn’t be the best configuration if security is the goal.
I mean unless specified otherwise most Synology container management dockers will run as root. With that said, if you want to secure things then there are guides.
An alternative path would be to setup a specific docker user and use docker compose to use that user when installing images
drfrankenstein.co.uk/step-2-setting-up-a-restrict…
Jellyfin example
drfrankenstein.co.uk/jellyfin-in-container-manage…
From there you could go further and use the guides above to create one user per docker image and give them different permissions depending on need.
Thanks this is very helpful
Its not as egregious as you think. ‘Everyone’ group means every Synology user account - not that everyone on the network that can talk to the NAS, they’d still need both a Synology account and Shared folder permissions. Any Synology user trying to access those files would still have to have read and write access to the Share to actually access it (eg via file explorer SMB/CIFs or app-level access to Synology File Manager, or they would need to be granted SSH access to get in via terminal, etc) in order to R/w/m the files.
I know it’s a bit confusing, but it’s correct. Docker often causes confusion with file permissions. There are file-level permissions (this article) and there are share-level permissions. You need both to access folders and files via mapped drives / SMB, this setting is just to ensure that Docker containers which can be running as a variety of user names (depending on how you config docker and the container) don’t experience issues accessing files you’re expecting them to be able to access, as Synology says, the default Docker folder permission is for the ‘everyone’ group to have Read-only access. This should allow most Docker containers configs to at least run and then if you run into issues writing/modifying files… That’s a clue you have missed some file permission configuration settings that need to be done, and the only reason it’s running at all is because that default ‘everyone’ permission is saving your butt.
The main thing I see you can avoid with locking down the docker images into a separate low permission user that can only access what they really need is if someone successfully attacks a project and you get infected with some shit when your Synology pulls image:latest.
It could limit the traversal of a ransomware that successfully breaks free of the container but ends up having no permissions outside as an example.
I would probably purge the whole NAS and setup from my backup for my own peace of mind even with the user separation though.
edit: updating “low user” to “low permission user”, amazing how the brain can fill in words for you when reading your own texts.
I do this for my containers. I have a completely domain-managed network, so my docker/podman host mounts an NFS share that contains all the data volumes for my services. Each one only has read permissions for the service account that runs it (and has nogroup). Each OCI container mounts their data volume(s) from their respective directory as well as a kerberos user TGT and credentials cache. Each OCI container runs as the service account, which uses the kerberized credentials to access the mounted data volumes (this is necessary), and thus I acheive separation. Even if a threat actor were to compromiee a service they would still be locked down to that service account and only able to access/modify the data of this service. This is still be very bad for services like keycloak, but for other trivial services it almost guarantees more than adequate segregation. This does fall apart a little bit with the recent copyfail and dirtyfrag exploits which allow for easy privilege escalation, but I don’t allow root squash so the data volumes on the NFS share are still
service_account:nogroupeven when accessing as root. Now an attacler could go through and use the KRBTGTs that are stored for each service account to access the data, but at that point I am dealing with a dedicated threat actor. Defending against someone explicitly seeking to compromise me is a different situation altogether, and still requires initial access through a vulnerable application that is sitting behind an SSL termination proxy and an NGFW with IPS capabilities.Thanks this is very helpful
To add to this, SMB implementations on Linux today simply respect the archaic model MS developed for LAN Manager (Windows 3.1, 1980’s), before Windows had local user permissions (NT 3.51 mid 90’s).
MS saw share permissions as a mechanism to provide admins some level of control for the small networks.
Once NT became the standard in business, we started ignoring share permissions and just letting file system permissions manage everything (since that could be managed via domain credentials).
It’s a whole lot easier and more secure to manage Groups in the Domain than a bunch of share permissions, and they’re lots more granular.
So we’re stuck with share permissions though they’re not all that useful - so most people (everyone?) simply ignore them and use just file system perms, which you have to manage even without shares.
TL:DR Share perms are a legacy thing and can simply be set to everyone read/write
Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I’ve seen in this thread:
5 acronyms in this thread; the most compressed thread commented on today has 22 acronyms.
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Good bot
I think it was just an example (poor one, true).
In my case, I just need to give access to my admin account in order for them to work - not the default admin account, to be clear.